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ABSTRACT 
 
 
INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF COMMON STOCK IN RELATION TO THEIR PRICE-EARNINGS 
RATIOS:  BASU 1977 EXTENDED ANALYSIS 
 
By 
 
 
Jordan R. Tilley, Masters of Science 
Utah State University, 2015 
 
 
Major Professor: Tyler Brough 
Department: Finance 
 
 
 In this study, the work of Basu 1977 is partly replicated using subsequent market data. A 
trading strategy of investing in assets based on their price-earnings ratio is back-tested, thus 
also testing the efficient market hypothesis. Market data over the past twenty-five years (1989-
2014) was gathered, cleaned, and modeled to test for unexplained return to five portfolios 
ranked by PE ratio. The data was tested using the single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model and 
the Fama-French three-factor model. The dataset was then decomposed by price and similarly 
modeled to test whether the effectiveness of using PE as a leading indicator is limited by the 
price level of an asset.  I conclude that investing in a portfolio comprised of the lowest PE ratio 
assets yields the highest unexplained returns over the period examined.  I also find that this 
strategy is primarily driven by low and mid-priced stocks, and does not hold at high price levels. 
In this analysis, the efficient market hypothesis does not hold. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The “Oracle of Omaha”, Warren Buffet, is quoted as saying, “I made my first 
investment at age 11. I was wasting my life up until then” (Buffet 2006). Schooled by the 
philosophy of Benjamin Graham, Buffet has long been hailed as a value-investor. Value 
investing is simply a strategy of selecting stocks that trade below their intrinsic value—these 
stocks are typically identified by their lower-than-average price-to-book or price-earnings 
ratios. In 1977 Basu published a work back-testing a value investment strategy entitled 
“Investment Performance Of Common Stock In Relation To Their Price-Earnings Ratios: A 
Test Of The Efficient Market Hypothesis.” He tests whether the PE ratio could be used as a 
leading indicator of performance. He concludes that over the fourteen-year time period of 
April 1957 – March 1971, “the low PE portfolios seem to have on average, earned a higher 
absolute and risk-adjusted rates of return than the high PE securities” (Basu 1977). 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, if this strategy truly existed, it would be 
exploited by investors until the extra return vanished. With frictions and lags, information 
did not disseminate as quickly into market prices in the 1960’s as it does today, thus 
investors might be able to use PE information as an indicator of future performance. Since 
1977, could have investors used this strategy in selecting investments to obtain excess risk-
adjusted return? The past twenty-five-year period is examined to see if this strategy holds. 
 
II. DATA 
 
 
 All financial data was sourced from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The 
data set was gathered and merged from three databases. Monthly closing stock prices and 
2 
 
holding period returns were gathered from the Center of Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
from June 1989 through May 2014. If a monthly closing price was not available the negative 
bid/ask spread was reported. The absolute value of those prices was taken and treated as 
closing prices. Stocks with prices less than $5 were not considered. The rationale was that 
low priced stock, including penny stocks, can demonstrate extreme values when dealing 
with ratios. As well, it was assumed that most rational investors don’t trade penny stocks. 
This removed about 85,000 observations of about 791,000.  
Quarterly earnings per share data (including extraordinary items) was pulled from 
Compustat. Some companies either did not report earnings or reported them as 0. This 
made for undefined PE ratios, and were therefore not considered. Also when observations 
reported negative EPS they were not considered in this analysis. Basu separately considers 
and does not consider negative earnings in his study, most likely to be thorough and 
comprehensive. Negative earnings were not considered here because it made for negative 
ratios and it was assumed rational investors wouldn’t buy companies who demonstrated 
negative earnings. The merit of value investing in low PE ratio stocks is the purchase of 
earnings at a low price. A high ratio, also else equal, would infer purchasing the same 
amount of earnings at a higher price. A negative ratio from negative earnings infers you are 
purchasing an asset that loses money.  
Lastly, I pulled the risk-free rate (30 day Treasury bill rate), excess return on the 
market, Small Minus Big, and High Minus Low factors from the Fama-French Portfolios and 
Factors database. Excess return on the market is calculated at the value-weight return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
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Ibbotson Associates). Small Minus Big (SMB) is the average return on the three small 
market-value portfolios minus the return on the three large market-value portfolios, and 
accounts for the difference in returns between large and small firms. High Minus Low (HML) 
is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two 
growth portfolios, and accounts for high book-to-market (value stocks) outperforming low 
ones (growth stocks). After cleaning, the dataset contained 698,538 observations. Summary 
statistics, including average ratio and return values, are reported with the performance 
measures after modeling in Table 1.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 Basu chose to rebalance his PE portfolios annually in his study, however notes that 
repeating the analysis monthly he finds substantially identical results (Basu 1977). If trading 
low PE assets does exhibit excess return, a rational investor might choose to update his 
portfolio more frequently—therefore monthly portfolio rebalancing was chosen in this 
study. PE ratios were calculated by dividing monthly prices by four times the reported 
quarterly EPS. The PE values were lagged one month to be used as leading indicators of 
performance. Every month, total observations were ranked into quintiles by PE ratios. Note 
that the number of portfolios chosen is arbitrary. I chose five groups to more closely follow 
the methodology of Basu. The five portfolio’s returns each month were then modeled over 
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the twenty-five-year period using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-
French 3-Factor (FF3F) models. The asset pricing equations are estimated: 
 
where:   Rp = the continuously compounded return on PE portfolio p each month    
 Rf = the continuously compounded “risk-free” rate each month 
 αp = the estimated intercept (Jensen’s alpha in CAPM, or FF3F alpha ) 
 ßp = the estimated slope of excess return (Market return minus “risk-free” rate) and 
measures “systematic risk” in the CAPM model 
Sp = the estimated slope of Small [market capitalization] minus Big 
hp = the estimated slope of High [book-to-market] minus Low  
εp = the error term 
Basu only used the single-factor CAPM model perhaps because it was the best 
model available at his time.  The FF3F model was later developed in 1993 by Eugene Fama 
and Kenneth French attempting to further describe stock returns beyond the single-factor 
Beta CAPM. The inclusion of the FF3F model in this study should explain stock returns 
beyond what the CAPM provided Basu and offer us a slightly different perspective (Fama 
1993). 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 The equations were estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) using the 300 
months of average return data on five portfolios each month—hence a total of 1500 
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observations in the regression analysis. Table 1 reports the results from the analysis and 
summary statistics.  
These results were similar to the results of Basu, yet also appear more drastic. The 
first thing to notice is the difference between the portfolios average PE ratio values; the 
differences all seem significant. There is a large disparity between even the fourth and fifth 
quintile, portfolio D and E, with averages of 23.66 and 88.53 respectively. We can assume 
there are some extremely high PE ratios in portfolio E pulling up the mean. The maximum 
PE ration in the sample was 8856.25. 
Second, consider the average returns of the portfolios. The low PE portfolio earned 
3.46% monthly compared to the high PE portfolio of 0.88% monthly. These are substantial 
amounts when compounded annually to 50% and 11%. Between portfolios the average 
returns seem to decrease almost monotonically as you increase towards higher PE 
portfolios. However, despite higher returns in the lower PE portfolios, the levels of 
systematic risk measured by Beta are not necessarily higher. The relationship between 
returns and beta appears to be contrary to capital market theory, which states higher 
returns are realized through higher levels of risk. Also note that Beta values are the highest 
on the end portfolios, and decrease toward the middle portfolio. This could demonstrate 
that these somewhat extreme portfolios are associated with higher levels of risk as 
measured by beta. 
The difference between the high PE portfolio E and low PE portfolio A had a Jensen’s 
alpha of 0.0269 with a test-statistics of 11.58 and a 3-Factor alpha difference of 0.0249 with 
a 16.18 test-statistic. Keep in mind this is excess unexplained monthly return. Once again, 
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annualized these returns would be 0.3751 and 0.3433 respectively. When compared to 
Basu’s resulted difference of almost .08 annual return, my alpha estimates seemed too 
extreme. The alpha between portfolios, like returns, also appears to be monotonic. This was 
less concerning to me as Basu had a similar outcome. In his work, he found an inverse 
relationship between beta and alpha (Basu 1977). My estimates were somewhat disturbing 
as I was sure I had done something incorrect. 
An explanation considered was the analysis was performed on an equally weighted 
basis with no consideration of value weight or market capitalization. A $5 low price stock, its 
returns and PE ratio, is treated equally with a $1000 stock with its returns and ratio. Instead 
of repeating the analysis using a value-weighted adjustment, I decided to isolate price to see 
if the PE ratio strategy would hold independent of the price of a stock. Perhaps only low 
price stocks exhibit extreme alpha using this PE strategy, and because they were equally 
weighted with high price stocks they biased our analysis when treated together. Testing 
this, I decomposed the stock observations into four groups by price: less than or equal to 
$10, between $10-20, between $20-35, and greater than $35. The observations were almost 
divided into equal groups. The modeling was then repeated on these four new price 
categories. Table 2 reports the outcomes of this analysis.  
This analysis added more insight and explanation. First, the average PE ratios 
reported between prices were interesting. As you increase price, it appears the average PE 
ratio increases as well – less than $10 stocks had an average PE ratio of 24.83 while the 
greater than $35 stocks had an average of 33.20. This seemed contrary to my first thought 
as I assumed that low price stocks generally leaned as growth (high PE ratio) compared to 
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high priced stocks. It does make sense however, that holding all else constant, increasing 
price— the numerator of our fraction— increases the PE ratio. 
 The beta values for all the price portfolios all exhibited similar estimates and 
relationships as our previous analysis — the highest values appear on the low and high 
portfolios and decrease toward the middle portfolio. For sample beta estimates by price 
group, the <$10 category had the highest value (highest systematic risk), and appears to 
decrease at a decreasing rate as you move to higher price levels. This would support 
thinking that low price stocks, including penny stock, have greater levels of risk, while higher 
prices lead to less risk, all else equal.  
Within the <$10 group, the hedge (A-E) returns were even more extreme than the 
previous analysis with Jensen’s alpha of 0.0506 and FF3F alpha of 0.0408 compared to 
0.0269 and 0.0249 respectively. As you move toward higher prices, however, the hedge 
return continually decreases, again almost monotonically, until at the >$35 group, Jensen’s 
alpha is 0.0069 and FF3F alpha is 0.0043. It appears from these results that the previous 
analysis’s estimates were heavily driven by low price stock. At the highest price level of 
<$35, PE ratio investing seems hardly effective. It does appear that even the mid-range price 
levels exhibited significant amounts of hedge alpha return from the strategy. Also notable 
was the summary alpha estimates between price groups. Despite the <$10 group exhibiting 
the largest hedge (A-E) return, it has insignificant and low estimates for its group as a whole. 
It seems this group has returns that are not easily explainable or linear. Beyond this group, 
as you increase price levels, the summary alpha estimates increase and become significant.  
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 As before in our first analysis, most of these alpha relationships seem apparent, 
even before we model our data, given by the average reported returns between the price 
and PE groups. After modeling it does explain away some of the returns, and some values 
become insignificant, but almost all relationships between groups remain.  
 
IV.                SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to test the relationship of stock performance in 
relation to its PE ratio, and thus test the efficient market hypothesis. Despite theory stating 
excess returns cannot be earned, it appears over the time period examined that investing 
using the PE ratio as a leading indicator produces excess unexplained returns for low and 
mid-priced stock. With low hedge alpha values, stock with prices above $35 show the PE 
strategy would be ineffective. Before isolating prices it appeared that this PE ratio strategy 
would work for all stock. Decomposing into price groups showed this strategy is driven by 
low/mid-priced stock. When back testing market data for strategies like this, it is important 
to realize factors that may be driving estimates. After being isolated or removed, the 
success of the strategy and relationship may altogether disappear. 
All these conclusions either mean the models used here are not appropriate at 
explaining asset returns, or the behavior of the securities during this period are inconsistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis. The focus of this study hasn’t been to critique asset 
pricing models or question their validity. The CAPM and FF3F model have served as practical 
tools to guide the testing of a trading strategy. The intent has been to merely discover from 
a practical standpoint whether an investor might capture alpha by implementing this PE 
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value-investment strategy. If the efficient market theory doesn’t hold, then the trading of 
these low-price stock with low PE ratios have exhibited excess unexplained returns over this 
period, and may do so in the future. Perhaps this inefficiency only exists at low price-levels. 
On the other hand, efficient market proponents may argue that there are increased levels of 
risk by investing in this strategy that have failed to be recognized in this study. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
(June 1989 - May 2014) 
 PE Portfolios    
Performance Measure/ 
Summary Statistic 
A (Low) B C D E (High) A - E Summary 
Avg P/E ratio 7.04 12.10 16.35 23.66 88.53 -81.49 29.54 
      (-85.34)  
Avg Return 0.0346 0.0213 0.0148 0.0115 0.0088 0.0259 0.0182 
      (5.97)   
Avg Excess Return 0.0319 0.0187 0.0121 0.0088 0.0061 0.0259 0.0155 
Ret-RF      (5.95)   
Avg Abnormal Return 0.0258 0.0125 0.0060 0.0026 -0.0001 0.0259 0.0094 
Ret-Mkt      (11.17)   
Systematic Risk (Beta) 0.9454 0.8443 0.8321 0.9448 1.1168 -0.1714 0.9328 
 (23.15)  (28.03)  (30.85)  (34.06)  (33.57)  (-3.25) (286.54)  
Jensen's alpha 0.0261 0.0135 0.0070 0.0030 -0.0008 0.0269 0.0098 
 (14.53)  (10.14)  (5.90)  (2.42)  (-0.54) (11.58)  (14.21)  
FF3F alpha 0.0241 0.0117 0.0055 0.0022 -0.0009 0.0249 0.0085 
  (17.49)  (12.40)  (6.67)  (2.42)  (-1.26) (16.18)  (15.53)  
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TABLE 2 
PERFORMANCE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS BY PRICE 
 
 PE Portfolios   
Performance 
Measure/ 
Summary 
Statistic 
Stock 
Price 
A (Low) B C D E (High) A - E Sample 
Avg PE ratio <10 3.68 8.94 14.16 23.58 73.83 -70.15 24.83 
       (-90.64)  
 10-20 6.82 11.64 15.91 23.43 86.14 -79.32 28.76 
       (-87.72)  
 20-35 7.83 12.55 16.46 23.02 84.05 -76.22 28.77 
       (-70.99)  
 >35 8.53 13.65 18.08 25.38 100.35 -91.82 33.20 
       (-31.60)  
Avg Return <10 0.0384 0.0216 0.0071 -0.0034 -0.0126 0.0510 0.0102 
       (9.05)   
 10-20 0.0345 0.0191 0.0109 0.0042 -0.0003 0.0347 0.0137 
       (7.72)   
 20-35 0.0342 0.0229 0.0174 0.0146 0.0115 0.0226 0.0201 
       (5.48)   
 >35 0.0340 0.0268 0.0248 0.0244 0.0285 0.0055 0.0277 
       (1.26)   
Systematic 
Risk (Beta) 
<10 1.1306 0.9795 0.9781 1.0003 1.0708 0.0598 1.0319 
  (14.50)  (16.95)  (19.85)  (19.28)  (20.91)  (0.64)  (36.48)  
 10-20 0.9699 0.8560 0.8418 0.9144 1.1093 -0.1394 0.9383 
  (22.27)  (22.35)  (23.81)  (25.50)  (28.72)  (-2.40) (49.93)  
 20-35 0.8942 0.7787 0.8045 0.9154 1.0933 -0.1991 0.8972 
  (25.64)  (24.63)  (27.98)  (34.46)  (33.24)  (-4.15) (60.14)  
 >35 0.8411 0.7997 0.8523 0.9046 1.0719 -0.2308 0.8939 
  (26.66)  (31.64)  (32.43)  (32.08)  (21.27)  (-3.88) (58.25)  
Jensen's 
alpha 
<10 0.0287 0.0128 -0.0016 -0.0122 -0.0219 0.0506 0.0012 
  (8.36)  (5.02)  (-0.74) (-5.35) (-9.70) (12.31)  (0.93)  
 10-20 0.0258 0.0112 0.0031 -0.0041 -0.0098 0.0356 0.0052 
  (13.41)  (6.63)  (1.98)  (-2.60) (-5.77) (13.86)  (6.30)  
 20-35 0.0259 0.0154 0.0097 0.0062 0.0021 0.0239 0.0119 
  (16.86)  (11.02)  (7.69)  (5.33)  (1.41)  (11.28)  (18.04)  
 >35 0.0261 0.0192 0.0169 0.0161 0.0192 0.0069 0.0195 
  (18.74)  (17.21)  (14.55)  (12.93)  (8.63)  (2.63)  (28.78)  
FF3F alpha <10 0.0258 0.0106 -0.0034 -0.0138 -0.0230 0.0488 -0.0008 
  (9.15)  (5.21)  (-2.09) (-7.93) (-13.47) (14.81)  (-0.75) 
 10-20 0.0236 0.0094 0.0013 -0.0054 -0.0104 0.0340 0.0037 
  (16.28)  (7.21)  (1.14)  (-4.50) (-9.13) (18.45)  (5.50)  
 20-35 0.0242 0.0135 0.0083 0.0054 0.0010 0.0232 0.0107 
  (19.10)  (13.10)  (8.47)  (5.60)  (2.02)  (17.09)  (19.00)  
 >35 0.0246 0.0182 0.0165 0.0163 0.0204 0.0043 0.0192 
    (20.29)  (18.17)  (15.11)  (15.37)  (11.95)  (2.03)  (30.11)  
 
